We propose a low-overhead scheme for detecting a network partition or cut in a sensor network. Consider a network S of n sensors, modeled as points in a two-dimensional plane. An ε-cut, for any 0 < ε < 1, is a linear separation of εn nodes in S from a distinguished node, the base station. Our main result is that, by monitoring the status of just O(1/ε) nodes in the network, the base station can detect whenever an ε-cut occurs. Furthermore, this detection comes with a deterministic guarantee that every reported cut has size at least εn/2. Besides this combinatorial result, we also propose efficient algorithms for finding the O(1/ε) nodes that should act as sentinels, and report on our simulation results, comparing the sentinel algorithm with two natural schemes based on random sampling.
Tracking the operational health of the infrastructure is important in any communication network, but it is especially important in sensor networks due to their unique characteristics and the need to perform this duty with very little overhead. In our view, power efficiency, scalability, and absence of false positives are the three most important considerations for a scheme to detect significant network failures. Because a sensor network's lifetime is largely determined by how well it conserves power, solutions where all sensors are continuously monitored are both inefficient and unscalable. This is especially true in remote-area long-term deployments where sensors are expected to be idle most of the time, sending data only when something rare and unexpected occurs. Because sensor networks can vary in size from a few hundred nodes to hundreds of thousands of nodes, it is also desirable to design schemes that are highly scalable, so that the task of cut detection does not end up consuming a large part of the network resources. Finally, because many sensor network applications envision unmanned and remote deployment, failure detection schemes that yield false positive, or false negatives, are highly undesirable. Every false positive requires the system administrator (or an exhaustive flooding scheme) to verify the live status of all the sensors, diluting the value of the monitoring scheme. In particular, schemes like random sampling, where a majority of the alarms can be false positive, are not very attractive. With this motivation, we now describe our problem setting.
Cuts in Sensor Networks
Consider a set S of n sensors, modeled as points in the two-dimensional plane. (More generally, we can assume that the sensors lie on a surface or terrain that is topologically equivalent to the plane.) An adversary can make a linear cut through the sensor network, disabling all the sensors on one side of the line; the base station is assumed to lie on the other (safe) side. Formally, given a directed line L, let L − and L + denote the left and right half-planes bounded by L, and let L − (S) and L + (S) denote the subset of sensors that lie in these half-planes. We will adopt the convention that the linear cut induced by L disables all the sensors in L − (S). Alternatively, the adversary can disrupt the communication so that sensors on the left side of the line cannot communicate with sensors on the right side, including the base station. These two formulations are equivalent for our purpose.
We call a linear cut an ε-cut if at least ε fraction of the sensors are cut off, where 0 < ε < 1 is a user-specified parameter. Formally, L is an ε-cut if |L − (S)| ≥ ε|S|. Our primary focus in this article is to develop a low-overhead scheme for detecting ε-cuts in sensor networks.
Our scheme for detecting ε-cuts chooses a small subset of sensors, which act as sentinels. (The name sentinel is only for convenience of reference; functionally, a sentinel is not different from any other sensor node in the system.) Each sentinel communicates with the base station at a regular time interval, and we assume that a sentinel's failure to communicate implies that it has been cut off. Our problem is to choose a small number of sensor nodes as sentinels so that, based solely on the live/dead status of sentinels, (1) we can detect every linear ε-cut, and (2) no reported cut is smaller than 1 2 εn. Figure 1 shows an example, with 1000 sensor nodes, distributed uniformly at random, and a sentinel set for ε = 0.05.
Before we delve into the technical details of the article, it is instructive to discuss why we chose ε-cuts as our definition, why avoiding false positives is challenging, and why the detection scheme requires an approximation slack.
ε-Cuts
The ε-cuts are motivated both by practical and theoretical concerns. It makes practical sense to consider a failure significant only when at least a constant fraction of the network is cut. It may be tempting to ask for schemes that detect the failure of a fixed (user-specified) number of sensors, regardless of the network size. However, no efficient and scalable solution is theoretically possible in this case, as the following simple example shows. Imagine n sensors arranged along a circle, and suppose we want to detect cuts of size m. Then, at least out one of every m consecutive sensors must be chosen as a sentinel; otherwise, an adversarial cut can go undetected. Thus we would need at least n/m sentinels, which scales very poorly with the network size.
False Positives
By monitoring sufficiently many randomly chosen sensors, one can detect all ε-cuts with high probability. For instance, a random sample of size O( 1 ε log 1 δε ) is sufficient to catch all ε-cuts with probability at least 1 − δ [de Berg et al. 2000] . It is known [Matoušek 1990 [Matoušek , 1993 that every linear cut L − (S) of size at least εn contains at least one sample point with probability at least 1 − δ. So we may simply report an ε-cut whenever at least one of the randomly chosen sensors fails. Unfortunately, this simple scheme suffers from the false positives problem. Many cuts reported by this algorithm are false positives, where the size of the failed network can be arbitrarily smaller than εn. Indeed, if one of the random samples happens to lie on the boundary of the sensor field, then it can cause an alarm even if a single sensor is cut off. A larger random sample can effectively eliminate false positives, but at the expense of a much higher number of sentinels. In particular, the concept of εapproximation can be used to distinguish between all cuts larger than εn and those smaller than, say, 1 2 εn. But an ε-approximation requires ( 1 ε 2 log 1 δ ) sentinel nodes to work correctly with probability at least 1−δ. A simple calculation, including the actual constants involved, shows that, even for modest values of ε = 0.1 and δ = 0.05, the size of the sentinel set is at least 10, 000. On the other hand, our scheme needs sentinel set of average size 10 for the same value of ε. Thus random sampling based schemes are infeasible, due to false positives or due to unscalably large size.
The Need for Approximation
Finally, we point out that we need to allow some approximation slack between an ε-cut and a false positive. If we allow only an additive error, then no scalable solution exists. For example, suppose we demand that all ε-cuts be reported, and no cut of size smaller than εn−q be reported, for a constant q ∈ N. Consider, once again, the setting of n sensors arranged along a circle. We claim that in this case at least every qth sensor must act as a sentinel. Otherwise, there is be a sequence s of q consecutive sensors none of which is a sentinel. Now consider two cuts: one where εn−q nodes preceding s are cut but none of the nodes in s is cut; and another where the cut includes all previous sensors as well as the nodes of s. These two cuts differ only in the sensors in s, none of which is a sentinel, so there is no way to distinguish between these two cuts. Yet only the second cut should be reported; the first is below the approximation threshold. Therefore, we adopt the standard convention and allow a constant ratio approximation on the size of any cut reported. Specifically, our algorithm will successfully report every ε-cut and, at the same time, every reported cut comes with a guarantee: at least an ε/2 fraction of the network must have been cut. The fraction 1 2 is chosen to simplify our analysis, and it can be replaced by any user-specified parameter.
Our Contributions
Our article makes three contributions. First, we prove a combinatorial result: for any real parameter ε, 0 < ε < 1, there exists a sentinel set of size O( 1 ε ) such that, by monitoring the sentinels only, we can report every network failure caused by an 1 2 -approximate ε-cut. That is, every cut L − (S) of εn sensors is reported, and every reported cut L − (S) includes at least 1 2 εn (failed) sensors. A key point to note is that the size of the sentinel set depends only on a userspecified parameter ε, and not on n, the size of the sensor network. Thus our construction is highly scalable. It is easy to see that the sentinel size of O( 1 ε ) is asymptotically optimal with increasing network size n.
Second, we describe two efficient algorithms, a deterministic algorithm for constructing a minimal sentinel set and a faster randomized algorithm for computing a sentinel set of size O( 1 ε ). All our algorithms are centralized, because we envision the entire process taking place at a base station.
Finally, we implemented our scheme and ran simulations using a variety of synthetic sensor network models. As predicted by theory, the size of the sentinel set does not grow with n, and depends only on ε, growing linearly with 1 ε . In our simulations, we found that the size of the sentinel set was always significantly smaller than the worst-case bound of Theorem 3.1. We also implemented a variety of optimizations that further reduce the sentinel set size and tighten the approximation bound for the detected ε-cuts. We compared our sentinel algorithm with two variants of sample-based schemes: random sampling and radial sampling. Our experiments show that, even for rather wellbehaved sensor distributions, these sampling methods produce a significant number of false positives and false negatives.
Related Work
The problem of network partition in sensor networks has been raised in several articles, but it appears not to have been investigated formally. Chong and Kumar [2003] raised this problem with a security focus: sensor networks may operate in hostile environments and schemes to detect tampering should be built into the design. Cerpa and Estrin [2004] proposed schemes for selfconfiguring sensor network topologies. They mentioned network partition as an important problem for which "complementary system mechanisms will be needed," Cerpa and Estrin [2004, p. 2] but left that as a future research direction. Lifton, Broxton and Paradiso [Lifton et al. 2002 ] considered a network disconnection problem, but with a very different focus: the nodes are cooperative. For instance, sensor nodes with low battery power communicate with the network to determine whether the network will be partitioned if they fail.
Our research is inspired by some recent work by Kleinberg et al. [Kleinberg 2000; Kleinberg et al. 2004] on detecting failures in a wired network. They modeled the network as an undirected graph on n nodes, in which an adversary can destroy up to k edges (or vertices), and the detection algorithm uses a set of detection nodes (equivalent to our sentinels) that engage in pairwise communication. They were interested in detecting when the graph is disconnected into two subsets, each of size at least εn. Kleinberg et al. [Kleinberg 2000; Kleinberg et al. 2004 ] showed that every graph has a set of O(k 3 1 ε log 1 ε + 1 ε log 1 δ ) sentinels (which they called an (ε, k)-detection set) that can detect an ε-cut with probability 1 − δ. There are three important differences between these results and our work. One, because of the inherent geometric structure of sensor networks, linear or other geometric partitions are more natural than k independent edge failures. Second, due to the geometric structure of our problem, O( 1 ε ) sentinels suffice in our case, while Kleinberg's setting requires a much larger set of monitoring nodes as well as pairwise communication between those nodes. Finally, and most significantly, our scheme comes with a deterministic guarantee that no cut smaller than 1 2 εn is ever reported, while the algorithms proposed in Kleinberg [2000] and Kleinberg et al. [2004] provide no comparable lower bound on the size of the cut. In view of the points raised in Section 1.4, therefore, we can say that the schemes of Kleinberg [2000] and Kleinberg et al. [2004] suffer from the problem of false positives while our scheme avoids it.
The network partition problem has connections with the theory of VCdimensions [Vapnik and Chervonenkis 1971] and ε-nets [Matoušek 1993 ]. In the geometric setting of sensor networks, ε-nets have the following property: given a set of n points S, an ε-net is a subset N ⊆ S such that any set R from a range space with finite VC-dimension whose intersection with S is greater than εn contains at least one element of N . If the VC-dimension of the ranges is d , 0 < d < ∞, then there exist ε-nets of size O( d ε log 1 εδ ). In fact, a random sample of this size is an ε-net with probability greater than 1 − δ. Unfortunately, ε-nets provide only one-sided guarantees: |R ∩ N | > 0 does not imply that |R ∩ S| ≥ εn. Thus ε-nets make poor sentinels: they raise too many false alarms.
An ε-approximation is a stronger form of sample. Given a set of n points S, an ε-approximation is a subset A ⊆ S, such that, for any range R with VCdimension d , we have the following inequality: |R∩A| |A| − |R∩S| |S| ≤ ε. That is, the ε-approximation intersects any range in (roughly) the same proportion as it intersects S, and so it would make a nice sentinel set. A random sample is an ε-approximation with probability greater than 1 − δ. Unfortunately the sample size, O( d ε 2 log 1 εδ ), required for such a strong probabilistic guarantees is too large. As mentioned earlier, with constant factors included, even with modest values of ε = 0.1 and δ = 0.05, the size of ε-approximation exceeds 10, 000.
The notion of sensitive ε-approximations was introduced in Brönnimann et al. [1999] as a common generalization of ε-nets and ε-approximations. It is a sample which is an ε-net for all cuts but it acts as an ε-approximation for small cuts. Because we are interested in only detecting when at least εn sensors are cut off, sensitive approximations can be used instead of ε-approximations. However, even sensitive approximations have O( 1 ε 4/3 log 1 δε ) size for linear cuts, whereas our sentinel sets have optimal O( 1 ε ) size. Besides, the deterministic construction of sensitive approximations is quite involved.
GEOMETRIC PRELIMINARIES
The network topology and the communication protocol are not directly relevant to our result. We simply assume that the sensor network is connected and that every sensor is able to communicate with a base station through multihop routing, as long as a valid communication path exists. We also assume that the location of every sensor is available to the base station. A set S of n sensors scattered in a terrain is modeled as a set of n points in the plane (ignoring the altitude of each sensor). Our problem of monitoring the integrity of the sensor field is best studied in a geometric setting.
Sentinel Sets
We wish to detect if the sensor network has suffered a linear cut of size at least εn. We do so by monitoring a small subset of sensor nodes, called the sentinel set W . An adversary can introduce a linear cut, by disabling all sensors lying on the left side L − of a directed line L. It is assumed that the base station lies on the safe side, L + . We call a directed line L an ε-cut if its halfplane L − contains at least ε fraction of all the sensors; formally, L is an ε-cut if |L − (S)| ≥ εn.
We would like to point out that the base station has no explicit information about the line L. It only learns the signature vector σ (W ) that represents the alive or dead status of the sentinel sensors; that is, σ (W ) is a binary vector of length |W |. Our goal is to compute a sentinel set of small size that can detect every ε-cut, but never reports a cut of size less than cεn, for some constant c, 0 < c < 1. For ease of presentation, we choose c = 1 2 in this article, but all our results generalize to any fixed value of c, 0 < c < 1 (see Section 3.3). With this motivation, we have the following definition.
Definition 2.1. Suppose S is a set of n sensors, and ε > 0 is a user-specified parameter. A subset of sensors W , W ⊆ S, is called an ε-sentinel set if, for any linear cut L, we can decide whether L is an ε-cut or that L is a smaller than ε 2 -cut, by observing only the signature σ (W ).
Thus the signature of an ε-sentinel set lets us detect every cut of size at least εn. Furthermore, we would also know which cuts have size less than ε 2 n. In the gray area where the size of the cut is between ε 2 n and εn, the algorithm is free to go either way: report it or ignore it.
By the definition of a linear cut, all the live sentinels in a signature σ (W ) are linearly separable from all the dead sentinels. While there may be infinitely many distinct lines affecting the same separation, by a suitable translation and rotation, we can always choose a representative line for each cut that passes through (at least) two sentinel nodes. Because a set of m points, where m = |W |, can produce at most m(m−1) = O(m 2 ) such directed lines, we can say that there are only O(m 2 ) combinatorially distinct linear cuts that can ever arise. Each such cut can be associated with a distinct signature. Because the base station cannot distinguish linear cuts that yield identical signatures, the family of lines corresponding to a specific signature σ (W ) must not contain an ε-cut and a lessthan ε 2 -cut simultaneously. This insight suggests that the sentinel problem can be formulated as a separation problem in a dual space, which we describe next.
A Duality Transform
We use a point-line duality of the Euclidean plane. The dual of a point p(a, b) is the line p * : y = ax − b and, conversely, the dual of a (nonvertical) line L : y = ax − b is the point L * : (a, b). The vertical lines can be handled by using a slightly more involved projective duality. Instead, we use the simpler transform here, and assume that all sensor nodes have distinct x-coordinates. In this way, for every vertical line, there is a slightly perturbed nonvertical line with the same signature σ (S). It can be easily checked that the duality transform inverts the above-below relation: If a point p lies above (respectively below) line L, then the dual line p * is below (respectively above) the dual point L * . A similar transform was used in Liu et al. [2002] for tracking a linear shadow over a sensornet.
The duality transform maps our set S of n sensors into a set S * of n lines. Conversely, a linear cut L is transformed into a point L * . If the line L is directed such that the left halfplane L − lies above the line L, then all the sensors above L are cut off in the cut induced by L. A similar argument holds when the halfplane L − lies below L. Thus, to cover both cases, we have to consider cuts where either εn points lie below the cut, or εn points lie above the cut.
Line Arrangements and Levels
The set of n lines S * in the dual plane forms a line arrangement, denoted H(S * ). The arrangement is a dissection of the plane into convex polygons, some of which are unbounded. The vertices of the arrangement are the intersection points between pairs of lines; the edges of the arrangement are the line segments between two consecutive vertices on a line. An arrangement of n line has at most n(n− 1)/2 vertices and at most n(n+ 1) edges. For technical simplification, we assume that no more than two lines pass through a vertex.
The set of edges in the arrangement that lie above exactly k − 1 other lines form an x-monotone polygonal curve. This curve is called the k-level of the arrangement. (A point (a, b) is above k lines if the ray {(a, y) : y ≤ b} crosses exactly k lines of the set S * .) The 1-level, for instance, is the lower envelope of the arrangement. A k-level bends at every vertex along its way. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
Consider a sentinel set W ⊆ S, and some linear cut L. The signature σ (W ) of W with respect to L tells us which sensors are below the line L and which ones are above L. In the transformed plane, this tells us which lines of W * pass above the dual point L * , and which ones pass below L * . In order for W to be an ε-sentinel, we should be able to decide for any point L * whether at least εn lines of S * pass below L * or fewer than εn/2 lines of S * pass below L * , based solely on the signature σ (W ). Thus W is an ε-sentinel if for any point L * we can tell if L * lies above the (εn)-level or below the (εn/2)-level of H(S * ) based on the location of the point L * in the arrangement formed by W * . The important point here is that we want to determine the approximate location of a point in the arrangement of S * , but to do so by looking only at the arrangement formed by the much smaller set W * . 
Minimum Link Separators in Arrangements
Given two disjoint simple polygonal curves, γ 1 and γ 2 , in the plane, a separator is a polygonal curve that partitions the plane into two parts such that γ 1 and γ 2 lie on opposite sides of . A minimum link separator for γ 1 and γ 2 is such a separator with the minimum number of vertices (i.e., bends).
A minimum link separator between the εn and the 1 2 εn levels of the arrangement H(S * ) can efficiently distinguish ε-cuts from the less than ε 2 -cuts. Specifically, if L * lies below ρ then L is certainly not an ε-cut; and if L * lies above ρ then L is surely an ε 2 -cut. A minimum link separator, in general, is free to use any lines. However, in our setting, this separator will be used to form a sentinel set, and therefore we must use only the lines of S * in the minimum link separator. (Indeed, the previously known algorithms for constructing separators did not require the separator be part of the arrangement [Edelsbrunner and Welzl 1986; Matoušek 1990 ].) Therefore, in the following discussion, we define the separator in an arrangement H to be a polygonal curve that only uses the edges of the arrangement H.
COMBINATORICS OF SENTINEL SETS
We have concluded that a separator between levels εn and 1 2 εn (symmetrically, a separator between levels (1 − ε)n and the (1 − ε 2 )n) in the dual arrangement H(S * ) can be used to form a ε-sentinel set. Conversely, one can easily see that the dual lines of a sentinel set contain a separator between these levels. In this section, we prove our first main result and show that there is a separator with O( 1 ε ) links. The sentinel set is formed by choosing the points whose dual lines contain these links. We next show that based on the signature σ (W ) of this set, we can determine in O( 1 ε log 1 ε ) time if there is a linear cut of size at least εn, or that the cut is smaller than εn/2. Since we do not know the orientation of the cut, we make two sentinel sets: one for the separator of top levels and and the other for bottom levels. If the signature of any one of them indicates a cut of size at least εn, then we declare there is an ε-cut in the network.
Existence of a Small Sentinel Set
The following theorem states our main combinatorial result. THEOREM 3.1. In an arrangement of n lines in the plane, there is always a separator of size O( 1 ε ) between levels εn and 1 2 εn. The proof of the theorem relies on three technical lemmas about separators and levels. Consider an a-level and a b-level in the arrangement of n lines in the plane, where 0 ≤ a < b ≤ n. For any integer k, where a ≤ k ≤ b, we define a specific x-monotone separator between the a-level and the b-level, which we call the zig-zag separator and denote by z(k). Informally, the separator z(k) starts with the leftmost segment of the k-level, follows that line until it runs into either the a-level or the b-level at a vertex, at which point it "reflects" and follows the other line incident to that vertex. Thus, the path z(k) zig-zags between the a-level and the b-level. We note that z(k) is an x-monotone path, it only uses the lines of the arrangement H(S * ), and all its "bends" are at convex Altogether there are b− a + 1 such paths between the a-level and the b-level, one for each value of k between a and b. The following lemma notes that these paths are pairwise edge-disjoint.
LEMMA 3.2. The b − a + 1 zig-zag separators between the a-level and the b-level are pairwise nonoverlapping; that is, they can only intersect at vertices.
PROOF. The leftmost edges of the zig-zag paths are pairwise disjoint by definition. If two zig-zag paths, say, z(k) and z(k ) meet at a vertex v and they reach v from the left on different lines, then v cannot be a convex vertex of the a-level nor a reflex vertex of the b-level, and so both z(k) and z(k ) pass through v without a bend. If v is a convex vertex of the a-level or a reflex vertex of the b-level, then only one zig-zag path can reach it from the left, and so only one path leaves it on the right.
Thus the total number of bends in all the (b − a + 1) zig-zag paths is upperbounded by the number of convex vertices of the a-level and the reflex vertices of the b-level. We therefore have the following lemma. LEMMA 3.3. If the a-level and the b-level have x vertices in total, then there exists a zig-zag path between them of size at most x b − a + 1 .
PROOF. Every convex vertex of the a-level and every reflex vertex of the blevel belongs to a unique zig-zag path, and x is an upper bound on the total number of these vertices. By the pigeon hole principle [Anderson 2004 ], at least one of the zig-zag paths must have no more than x b−a+1 vertices. So how many vertices can a single level of the n-line arrangement have? Unfortunately, determining the asymptotic complexity of levels in line arrangement is a notoriously difficult problem in computational geometry [Erdős et al. 1973 ]. The best-known upper bound for the complexity of a k-level is O(nk 1/3 ) due to Dey [1998] , and the best lower bound is (n · 2 √ log k ) due to Tóth [2001] .
On the other hand, the average size of the first k levels is always linear. In particular, Alon and Győri [1986] showed that, for any k, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n/2, the total size (number of vertices) of the levels 1 through k is nk. We use this result to show that there is a linear size level in the vicinity of an (εn)-level and of an (εn/2)-level.
LEMMA 3.4. In an arrangement of n lines in the plane, there is always a level of size at most 6n between the levels 5 6 εn and εn. Similarly, there is always a level of size at most 4n between levels 2 3 εn and 1 2 εn. PROOF. By the result of Alon and Győri [1986] , the total complexity of the first εn levels is at most εn 2 . Clearly this is also an upper bound on the total complexity of the 1 6 εn + 1 levels between levels εn and 5 6 εn. By the pigeon hole principle, at least one of these levels must have size at most εn 2 /( 1 6 εn + 1) ≤ 6n. An analogous argument shows that there is a level of size at most 4n between levels 2 3 εn and 1 2 εn. We can now complete the proof of Theorem 3.1. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. Consider an arrangement of n lines in the plane. Choose a and b such that 1 2 εn ≤ a ≤ 2 3 εn, 5 6 εn ≤ b ≤ εn, and the size of the a level is at most 4n and the size of the b-level is at most 6n; such a and b exist by the preceding lemma. The total size of these two levels is at most 10n, and (b − a + 1) ≥ 1 6 εn. By Lemma 3.3, we conclude that there is a zig-zag path of size O( 1 ε ) between levels a and b. This zig-zag path is clearly a separator between the εn and the 1 2 εn levels. The constant factors in Theorem 3.1 are quite loose. Our primary goal is simply to prove the asymptotic result that sentinel sets of size O( 1 ε ) exist. Our simulations show that in practice the sentinels sets are significantly smaller than the worst-case bound would indicate.
Detecting ε-Cuts from a Signature
The εn sensors that are cut off by a linear cut L − (S) may lie either below or above the line L. We therefore compute two separators, one to detect separation of points below the cutting line, and the other to detect separation above the line. In order to avoid unnecessary replication, we describe our scheme for the lower separator, with the understanding that the complete construction involves a symmetric application of the algorithm for the other case as well.
We have shown that there is an O( 1 ε ) size separator between levels εn and 1 2 εn in the arrangement. We choose our sentinel set W to be the dual of these O( 1 ε ) lines. (We will show how to find these lines in Section 4.) Let W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m } denote the set of points (sensors) in the sentinel set, where m = O(1/ε). We now show how to use the signature σ (W ) to determine whether there is an ε-cut or the cut is below the ε 2 -cut threshold. Let us consider what a signature σ (W ) represents in the dual plane. The points corresponding to a sentinel set W map to m = |W | lines, and form an arrangement; this arrangement is a subset of the full arrangement H(S * ). The arrangement H(W * ) divides the plane into O(m 2 ) convex cells. We observe that each distinct signature σ (W ) corresponds to a unique cell in this arrangement (see Figure 4 ); this is also why the number of distinct signatures is O(m 2 ), as mentioned earlier. Each signature represents a distinct pattern of dead or alive status sensors where this pattern is realizable by a linear cut. This pattern, and the signature, is the same for every line that lies above and below the same set of sentinels. The points in every convex cell of the arrangement H(W * ) form an equivalence class, since they have the same lines of W * passing below (respectively above) them. The dual of an equivalence class is an equivalence class of lines in the primal plane. The next key observation is that no convex cell of H(W * ) straddles both the εnand the 1 2 εn-levels of H(S * ). That is, each cell is either entirely below the εn-level, or entirely above the 1 2 εn-level. This follows from our construction of W : the separator used to construct W lies entirely between these two levels. Thus, in the accepted range of approximation, the points in each cell of the dual arrangement H(W * ) are equivalent. With this idea, we can now describe our scheme for detecting an ε-cut.
Given a separator of size O( 1 ε ) between levels εn and 1 2 εn in the arrangement H(S * ), the set W * of lines spanned by the separator edges (the dual lines of the sentinels), and a signature vector σ (W ), we can report ε-cuts as follows. If a sensor w i is dead, then we know that the dual of any possible linear cut L must be above w * i . Otherwise, we know that the dual must be below w * i . In either case, one of the two halfplanes defined by w * i is where the dual point L * could possibly be. We determine the common intersection C of all the m halfplanes, one for each w * i , which can be computed in O(m log m) time by a standard divide and conquer algorithm [Preparata and Shamos 1985] . We then choose an arbitrary point p ∈ C in this common intersection, and determine if p lies above or below the separator. This can be done in O(log m) time because the separator is xmonotone and it has m links: It is sufficient to find the line w * ∈ W * (by binary search) that lies directly above or below p, and test against that. If p is above the separator, we report that there is an ε-cut. Otherwise, we report that no ε-cut exists. Figure 4 shows an example with six sentinel nodes. The half-planes corresponding to sentinels which are alive are shown by w + i and ones which are cut by w − i . Suppose that only w 2 , w 5 , and w 6 send signals to the base station, and so w 1 , w 3 , and w 4 are assumed to be cut off. The dual of any ε-cut must lie above the lines w * 1 , w * 3 and w * 4 , and it must lie below the lines w * 2 , w * 5 , and w * 6 . The common intersection of these halfplanes is shown as C. A point p ∈ C lies above the ε-separator (drawn in bold line), and so we report an ε-cut.
Sentinel Size Versus Error Parameter Tradeoff
We can improve the error guarantee between the largest cut not reported and ε-cut at the expense of a larger sentinel set. In our basic scheme, we have used the error parameter of 1 2 , but a slight modification works for any fixed error parameter α < 1. In other words, given any fixed 0 < α < 1, we can find a sentinel set that detects all ε-cuts and never reports a cut that is smaller than (1 − α)εn.
As expected, this sharper guarantee comes at a price: we need a larger sentinel set. Following the proof outline of the previous sections, we simply need to find a separator between levels εn and (1 − α)εn in the dual plane. We prove the following combinatorial lemma about size of this separator.
LEMMA 3.5. In an arrangement of n lines in the plane, there is always a separator of size O( 1 εα 2 ) between levels εn and (1 − α)εn. PROOF. Consider an arrangement of n lines in the plane. Choose a and b such that (1 − α)εn ≤ a ≤ (1 − 2α/3)εn and (1 − α/3)εn ≤ b ≤ εn, and the size of the a-level is at most (3/α − 2)n and the size of the b-level is at most 3n/α; such a and b exist by an argument similar to Lemma 3.4. The total size of these two levels is at most (6/α − 2)n, and (b − a + 1) ≥ αεn/3. By Lemma 3.3, we conclude that there is a zig-zag path of size 3(6/α − 2)/(αε) = O( 1 εα 2 ) between levels a and b.
COMPUTING A SENTINEL SET
The results of the previous section have established that a sentinel set of size O( 1 ε ) always exists. In this section, we consider the relevant algorithmic question: how can we determine such a set efficiently. In fact, our proof of Theorem 3.1 directly leads to a deterministic algorithm: we first compute the a and b levels, which are each of linear size, then find all the zig-zag separators, and pick the smallest one, which is guaranteed to have size O( 1 ε ) size. However, a straightforward algorithm based on the proof has a few drawbacks: first, it requires the computations of essentially all the levels from 0 to εn, which takes (n 2 log n) time and (n 2 ) space; second, such an algorithm only guarantees the worst-case bound for the separator, and does not necessarily find the minimumsize separator possible for a particular input instance. Thus we present two improved schemes: an O(n 2 log n) time deterministic algorithm that computes a minimum link separator, and an O( n ε log n) time randomized algorithm that computes an O( 1 ε ) size separator. The former has the advantage that it computes the smallest possible set of sentinels. The latter is guaranteed to find only an O( 1 ε ) size sentinel set, but it is computationally more efficient.
Finding a Minimum Link Separator
We describe an algorithm to compute a minimum link separator between levels a and b in an arrangement of n lines in the plane; the choice of a = 1 2 εn and b = εn, in particular, guarantees that the minimum link separator has size at most O( 1 ε ). The algorithm runs in O(εn 2 log n) time. For our experimental results in Section 6, we implemented this algorithm and used it to construct sentinel sets as described in the previous section.
The algorithm implicit in our proof only uses the vertices of the aand blevels. A minimum link separator, however, can use any lines and vertices between these two levels. Our new algorithm performs a plane-sweep over the arrangement H(S * ), and for every edge e (between levels a and b) computes the minimum number of turns necessary to reach it from the left horizon boundary. In this way, we can compute the optimal separator between the levels a and b.
Let R be an axis-aligned rectangle containing all vertices of the arrangement H(S * ). The algorithm processes the εn 2 vertices of the arrangement on or below the (εn)-level from left to right. (We assume that all vertices below the (εn)level are available to the algorithm, although we can just as well compute it online during the plane sweep.) The sweep-line starts at the left boundary of R and moves horizontally to the right, until it reaches the right boundary of R. For each edge e of the arrangement, we compute a count t(e), which is the minimum number of turns necessary to connect e to the left side of R through an x-monotone curve using only the edges of the arrangement between levels a and b. We initialize this count to be t(e) = 0, for each edge e incident to the left side of R between the levels a and b.
Consider the event when the sweep-line encounters a new vertex v (between levels a and b). This vertex has two edges incident from the left, and two edges incident from the right. Let e 1 and e 2 be the edges on the left, and let f 1 and f 2 be the edges on the right; assume that e 1 , f 1 belong to the same line, and e 2 , f 2 belong to the same line. If all these four edges are between levels a and b, then we update the counts as follows: t( f 1 ) := min{t(e 1 ), t(e 2 ) + 1} and t( f 2 ) := min{t(e 2 ), t(e 1 ) + 1}. On the other hand, if v is a convex vertex of the a-level or a reflex vertex of the b-level, then only two of the four incident edges are between levels a and b. Suppose e 1 and f 2 are between the a and b levels. In that case, we update the count t( f 2 ) := t(e 1 ) + 1, and set t( f 1 ) := ∞. Symmetrically, if e 2 and f 1 are between the levels a and b, we update t( f 1 ) and set t( f 2 ) to infinity.
When the sweep-line reaches the right side of R, we have computed t(e) for all edges e. We compare the values t(e) of edges incident to the right side of R between levels a and b. A minimum value t(e 0 ) corresponds to an x-monotone path between levels a and b with the minimum number of bends. It is not difficult to see that there is always an x-monotone minimum link separator between two levels of an arrangement, and so the minimum value t(e 0 ) corresponds to a minimum link separator, which we can output by back-tracking. Our implementation of the sweep-line algorithm processes all O(n 2 ) vertices, from left to right. Sorting the vertices by x-coordinates requires O(n 2 log n) time, which can be done either in advance or online by updating an event queue. At every vertex, only O(1) work is done. We record all computation in O(n 2 ) space in order to be able to back-track and output a minimum link separator when the line-sweep terminates. We compute an optimal size minimum link separator in O(n 2 log n) time and O(n 2 ) space. We can further optimize the scheme so that it processes only the intersection points inside levels εn/2 and εn. We can compute these two levels in O(ε 1/3 n 4/3 log n) time [Har-Peled 2000] and run the plane sweep algorithm on the O(εn 2 ) vertices between them. As a result, one can compute an optimal-size minimum link separator in O(εn 2 log n) time and O(εn 2 ) space.
A Randomized Algorithm for Computing a Separator
We now describe an asymptotically faster (and subquadratic) randomized algorithm for computing a separator of size O( 1 ε ). If the sentinel sets are computed frequently, for instance, if the sensors are mobile or to periodically rotate the sentinel duties, the randomized scheme might be more efficient. The basic idea of our randomized algorithm goes back to our combinatorial proof presented in Section 3. Every time we use the pigeon hole principle to find a below-average size level and a zig-zag path, we can use a random level and zig-zag path. The random choice will return a level or path of expected (average) size with constant probability.
In particular, we begin by choosing two integers uniformly at random a ∈ [ 1 2 εn, 2 3 εn] and b ∈ [ 5 6 εn, εn]. The expected size of the a-level and the b-level is 4n and 6n, respectively. Since the size of a level is always non-negative, by Markov's inequality the size of the a-level and the b-level is O(n) with constant probability. (The probability depends inversely on c, c > 6, where cn is the bound on the size of our aand b-levels.)
We do not explicitly compute the aand b-levels, but simply use the level number to determine when to back off in our zig-zag path computation. We next choose a random number k ∈ [a, b] and compute the zig-zag path between levels a and b starting with the leftmost portion of the k-level. The expected size of the resulting zig-zag path is O( 1 ε ) with constant probability by Lemma 3.3. In order to compute the zig-zag path z(k), we start at the leftmost line of level k, which can be computed in O(n log n) time, by ordering the leftmost points of the lines. Next we need to know when to reflect off the aor the b-level. To do that, we simply compute the intersection of the remaining n − 1 lines with . At each intersection, the level either increases or decreases, depending on the relative position of the line intersecting . As soon as the level reaches either a or b, we stop traversing , and switch to the other line that crosses at that intersection point. We continue until we reach the right side of the bounding box R.
Since the zig-zag path z(k) has expected complexity O( 1 ε ), and each segment can be traced in O(n log n) time, the expected time of the algorithm is O( n ε log n). It is important to note that although the size of sentinel has probabilistic guarantees, the resulting zig-zag path is always a separator between levels 1 2 εn and εn. In our experiments, we found that in practice the size of the ε-sentinel set is consistently smaller than the worst-case combinatorial bound.
ADDING FAULT TOLERANCE
One of our key assumptions has been that only an adversary (the source of the network partition) causes a sensor node to fail. In reality, isolated node failures are expected to be common: sensor devices are tiny, fragile, and often deployed in hazardous environments. Thus it is important to provide a certain degree of fault tolerance in a cut detection scheme: it should not be easily fooled by isolated failures of one or few sentinels. Our basic scheme breaks down because it depends crucially on the linear separation among live and dead sentinels. We propose one possible method for supplementing our basic scheme to achieve fault tolerance: we install t disjoint sentinel sets, and report a cut when all of the sets detect it as an ε-cut. Algorithmically, we can run the Min-Link-Separator algorithm t times, and in each successive round we exclude the sensors (their corresponding dual lines) that are already present in the sentinel set of the previous rounds. This ensures that the sentinel sets are independent. Sentinels in each set send a message periodically to the base station, and the base station tests each sentinel set independently for ε-cuts. A cut is confirmed as an ε-cut if every test detects it as an ε-cut.
A random fault leads to two possible consequences. (i) The dual half-planes of the sentinels have an empty intersection-this is not a critical error, since in this case we know the information was corrupted, and simply ignore it. (ii) The intersection is nonempty, but different from the actual intersection. In the second case, the algorithm may lead to an incorrect answer, but this will only result in more false positives, and no false negatives. This is because the algorithm concludes that more sentinels are cut off and will overestimate the number of sensors that the possible cut has destroyed. This means that even with random faults in the network, all the real ε-cuts will still be detected.
We now argue that the probability of false positive with this scheme decreases exponentially with the number of sentinel sets. Suppose that each sensor can fail independently at random with probability p. Let us write this probability as a function of the sentinel set size |W |, namely, p = k |W | . That is, the expected number of failed nodes in any sentinel set W is k.
The probability that none of the |W | sentinels in a detection set fails is (1 − p) |W | . Thus the probability that all t disjoint sentinel sets are corrupted is at most (1 − (1 − p) |W | ) t . Assuming that 2k ≤ |W |, we can bound this probability as
That is, the probability of error in detection due to random faults reduces exponentially with t.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we describe our simulation results that are intended to evaluate the scalability of our sentinel based scheme. We also performed experiments comparing our scheme with some simple sampling-based methods. The geometric distribution of sensors is likely to vary widely from application to application. We therefore generated several random and nonrandom distributions of points in the plane to model a variety of sensor networks. We used three main data sets in our simulation: (1) uniform, (2) clustered, and (3) US census data. Figure 5 shows example distributions of these three sets. The uniform set contains n random points uniformly distributed in a square. The clustered set contains n points, equally divided among k clusters. Each cluster is centered at a random point, and the points in the cluster are generated using a Gaussian distribution. The last set is a US Tiger Census map, which includes locations of 14,000 geographical features in the USA. 1 We chose these locations as positions for the sensors.
Our first set of experiments show the scalability of the sentinel sets as a function of n and ε.
Scalability with Network Size
In order to isolate the effect of network size, we first ran our experiments for various values of the network size, while keeping ε fixed at 0.01. We then repeated these experiments with other values of ε, and found the scaling behavior to be nearly identical to the ε = .01 case. We therefore only report our results for ε = .01. We generated networks of all three types (uniform, clustered, and tiger), with n varying from 1000 to 14,000; for the census data, we randomly chose n points from the set for n smaller than 14K . All the results shown in this experiment are averaged over five different seed values for the random number generator.
As predicted by the theory, the results ( Figure 6) show that the size of the sentinel set is independent of n. Since specific input instances can have slightly different sizes of sentinel sets, we notice a small variation in the size as we vary n. For smaller values of n, the levels 1 2 εn and εn in the dual arrangement have less pronounced features, which leads to a slightly narrower gap between the minimum size separator (Figure 6(a) ) and an average separator ( Figure 6(b) ). However, in all cases, the observed size of the sentinel set is well within the worst-case bound of Theorem 3.1. The sentinel set for our randomized algorithm ( Figure 6 (b) was observed to be roughly a factor of 5 larger than that for the Min-Link-Separator, but even that is much smaller than the theoretical worst-case Detecting Cuts in Sensor Networks bound. This shows that, in practice, the fast randomized algorithm also gives a reasonably small sentinel set.
Scalability with ε
In this experiment, we evaluated the behavior of our scheme with different values of the cut threshold ε. These experiments were performed with networks of a fixed size n = 5000. We varied ε from 0.01 to 0.1, and the results are shown in Figure 7 ; again, all the results are averaged over five different seed values for the random number generator. As expected, the size of the sentinel set increases as the value of ε decreases (see Figure 7 (a). Still, the size of the sentinel sets in all cases is significantly smaller than the worst-case bound of Theorem 3.1. Even for very small values of ε, say, ε = 0.01, the algorithm generates sentinel sets of size less than 20. The size of the sentinel set for the randomized algorithm is again larger than the Min-Link-Separator (see Figure 7 (b), though certainly smaller than the worst-case bounds of Theorem 3.1.
Comparison with Other Schemes
We mentioned earlier that the problem of detecting network cuts has been raised in several articles, but no algorithms seem to have been proposed. Thus we do not have any specific algorithm with which to compare our results. (The ε-approximation has the same approximation guarantees, but it requires a very large set of sentinels.)
Instead, we implemented two natural heuristics to evaluate their effectiveness in comparison to our sentinel algorithm. Both schemes are based on sampling. In the first one, called random sampling, we chose a certain number of sensors uniformly at random and designated them as sentinels. Whenever any one of these chosen sentinels was cut off, the algorithm declared an ε-cut. In order to make a fair comparison with our sentinel scheme, we chose the same number of random nodes as the size of our sentinel set. A second scheme used radial sampling: we chose |W | directions uniformly, where |W | was the size of the sentinel set for that instance. For each direction, we chose the εnth extreme point as a sentinel. 2 Clearly, for the chosen set of directions, the selected set of points form an optimal sentinel set. Thus, in all our evaluations, the number of sentinels was the same for all three schemes.
For each test case, we first ran our Min-Link-Separator algorithm to compute the sentinel set W , and then chose |W | sentinels with the random sampling and the radial sampling schemes. We evaluated the effectiveness of these schemes using false negatives and false positives, that is, how many ε-cuts are missed by these schemes (false negatives), and how many reported cut are smaller than 1 2 εn. Our sentinel scheme yielded no false positives or negatives, as guaranteed by theory.
We fixed n = 5000, and varied ε in the range [0.001, 0.1]. We show the results averaged over all the datasets, because we found that the characteristics of error were very similar across different sets. We simulated a large number of random linear cuts, and measured the false positives and negatives in each case.
For false negatives, we generated 250 random cuts between the εnand 2εnlevels of the dual arrangement. All these are true ε-cuts and, therefore, should be detected. Figure 8 shows that the sentinel scheme correctly detects all these cuts, but the random and radial sampling miss a significant fraction (between 10% and 40%) of them. Notice that we have removed the bar for sentinel set from Figure 8 , since they were consistently zero. We also ran experiments where cuts were chosen randomly between εnand 10εn-levels, and the results were essentially identical.
A further study (results not shown here) revealed that these incorrect decisions were also arbitrarily bad in terms of quality. With ε = .01, for instance, nearly 8% of the false negatives were in fact cuts where more than Detecting Cuts in Sensor Networks Random Radial Sentinel Set Fig. 9 . False positives: the cuts reported by the random and the radial sampling that were below the approximation threshold 1 2 εn. Our sentinel scheme had no false positives.
7εn of the sensors were cut off; and some cuts of size up to 10εn remained undetected.
For false positives, we generated 250 cuts by randomly sampling between level-1 and level-1 2 εn. These cuts were all below the approximation threshold, and so should not be reported. However, as Figure 9 shows the random and the radial sampling schemes misreport some of them as ε-cuts.
In conclusion, even for relatively well-behaved distributions, the sampling schemes yield many false positives and negatives. Because the sentinel scheme chooses its sentinels carefully based on the distribution of points, in more irregular distributions, it can have significantly fewer sentinels than random sampling-based methods. For instance, consider an example with three clusters of εn points each near the corners of an isosceles triangle; the remaining n − 3εn points lie in a cluster near the center of the triangle. Our scheme picks a constant number of sentinels from the three corners, which are sufficient to detect all ε-cuts. In random sampling, it will take ( 1 ε log 1 εδ ) samples to ensure with probability 1 − δ that nodes from all three corner clusters are selected. Similar constructions are possible for radial sampling too.
Variations with Error Parameter
In this experiment we evaluated the performance of our algorithm with different values of the error parameter α. (The parameter controls the range of acceptable cut sizes: all cuts above εn must be reported, and no cut below (1−α)εn must be reported, but in the range [(1 − α)εn, εn] the algorithm can choose either way.) We ran the Min-Link-Separator and randomized algorithms on all three datasets, with fixed parameters ε = .01 and n = 5000 and varied α in the range [0, .7] . To test the effectiveness of our scheme, we generated 250 cuts in the range [0, εn). These cuts were clearly not ε-cuts, but since our scheme may detect some cuts of size between [(1 − α)εn, εn] as ε-cuts, some of them would be incorrectly classified as ε-cuts. We first plot the variation of size of sentinel set with α in Figure 10 and the variation of error with α in Figure 11 . As expected, the inaccuracy (percentage of incorrect cuts) decreases with decreasing α, while the size of sentinel set increases. The cut-detection with high accuracy (α = 0.05) can be achieved with roughly 180 sentinels for all datasets. But the results show that an inaccuracy of less than 5% (α = 0.2) can be achieved with sentinel set of size less than 40.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have proposed a simple, low-overhead scheme for detecting cuts (partitions) in sensor networks. We have shown that linear ε-cuts can be detected by monitoring just O( 1 ε ) nodes of the network, which is asymptotically the best possible; a simple example of n sensors arranged in a circle gives a matching lower bound. In practice, however, we expect even fewer than 1 ε sentinels, which is borne out by our simulation results. An important feature of our algorithm is the lack of false positives or false negatives. Thus every cut of size εn or larger is detected, and no cut is reported unless it includes at least 1 2 εn nodes. One issue that we did not completely address is the noise or the inherent instability of individual sensor nodes. If one of the sentinel nodes dies naturally, it can mislead our algorithm. As we mentioned, one possible way to deal with the inherent unreliability of individual sensors is to use multiple copies of sentinel sets. This approach, however, relies on a probabilistic argument to show that it works under faulty conditions. Finding cutdetection schemes that are inherently fault-tolerant to multiple individual node failures is a challenging research problem, and a topic of our future work. We have implicitly assumed that the network cut does not destroy the communication path between any live sentinel and the base station. If a live sentinel's path does get disrupted, we can use any of the reactive ad hoc network protocols to discover and set up a new path to the base station.
We have also tried to minimize the communication cost for detecting linear cuts by using only a small number of sentinel nodes. Different sets of sentinels, however, may lead to different communication costs, and an important secondorder optimization would take this effect into account. Another way to minimize the communication in the network would be to make the cut detection more decentralized. These are both very practical questions and natural directions for future work.
In this article we have limited ourselves to linear cuts. This is an important and natural class of cuts, but a richer set of cuts would include circular cuts, rectangular cuts, and polygonal cuts. These classes, including the polygonal cuts as long as the polygons have only a constant number of sides, are ranges with a finite VC-dimension. Therefore, the basic method of ε-approximation can be used to construct sentinel sets for each of these classes. Unfortunately, as we mentioned earlier, the worst-case bounds for ε-approximations and sensitive approximations are not very attractive. We plan to investigate if, using
